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HAT THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS READY

for far-reaching progress

and reforms with regard to forensic psychiatry has been again
demonstrated by the recent decision in Durham v. United

States.
This opinion is a most revealing document. To the extent that it
relies on and quotes current psychiatric authorities, it is on shaky
ground.' The publications cited contain serious errors, and discuss the
question of legal insanity in the abstract without any substantial proof
for their assertions. 2 Judge Bazelon's final conclusion is unfortunately
based on the psychiatric vagaries found in some of these publications.
He substitutes a new test for the M'Naghten rule. In essence it requires that the plea of legal insanity must be based on a demonstration
that the crime was the product of mental disease. If he had had better
psychiatric advice, Judge Bazelon would have known that this is precisely how the M'Naghten rule has been interpreted in practice by
experienced psychiatrists. In civil courts, before lunacy commissions,
and in courts-martial of the Army and Navy, I have testified that if
this particular mental disease had not existed there would have been
no crime. Using this interpretation of the rule, for example, I testified
* This comment was to have been included in a book review by Dr. Wertham appearing in this issue at p. 569. In view of its relevance to the Durham case, however, it has
been included in the symposium.
t Practicing psychiatrist, author, and lecturer.
'I have critically examined and analyzed this type of literature in a number of publications: Review of Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine and Man, 108 New Republic 707 (May 24,
1943); Review of Overholser and Richmond, Handbook of Psychiatry, N.Y. Times Book
Review (Jan. 4, 1948); Review of Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law,
3 Buffalo L. Rev. 41 (1953); Review of Branham and Kutash, Encyc. of Criminology,
12 Psychosomatic Medicine 267 (1950); Review of Cohen, Murder, Madness and the
Law, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 810; Review of East, Society and the Criminal, 27 N. Y. U.
L. Rev. 183 (1952); The Road to Rapallo (The Ezra Pound Case), a Psychiatric
Study, 3 Am. J. of Psychotherapy 584; Why Do They Commit Murder?, N.Y. Times
Mag. p. 8 (Aug. 8, 1954).
2 The Report of the Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (May 1954) contains this classical definition (p. 6): "Mental illness
is a behavioral expression of ego impairment"! Is such doubletalk supposed to help a

jury?
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for a seventeen-year-old youth who had killed his mother; over the
objection of the psychiatrist for the prosecution, he was forthwith
committed to an institution for the criminally insane.3
If a crime is really the product, the result, the symptom of a psychosis, it is inevitable that the person who committed it cannot sufficiently distinguish between right and wrong and/or sufficiently know
the nature and quality of his act. This fact is known to any psychiatrist who understands that the M'Naghten rule refers to the "true
capacity of the individual," to use Judge Cardozo's words.4 Whether
Judge Bazelon's new definition will improve the present unfortunate
state of forensic psychiatry is doubtful. As a legal test this new definition is insufficient: it gives undemocratic leeway to the partisan and/or
bureaucratic expert, and, on account of its wording, lends itself to
grave abuse. It does not guide the jury as to the degree of mental disease, a term which includes psychosis and neurosis. Two cases will
indicate the importance of this point. A mature, well-educated man had
sexual relations with a child. He was sentenced to death, but on account of his standing in the community this sentence was commuted
to life imprisonment. Released after a few years, he committed the
same offense again. He was then sent for observation to a psychiatric
hospital, where I had occasion to study him. There was no question
that his criminal acts were "the product of mental disease." He had an
infantilistic fixation on children as sex objects. Yet the law of legal
insanity is not intended to exculpate such a man who does not suffer
from a psychosis, i.e., a major mental disease, and who is not committable. Another example is the case of a physician who received a jail
sentence for practicing criminal abortions. Released from jail, he
started the same activities again. Analysis of his case showed that he
had a long-standing neurotic drive to prove his mastery over the female
sex in its procreative function. There was no doubt that his activities
were the product of a mental disease. But again, in my opinion, it was
not of such a degree as to fit within any usable test of legal insanity.
Just as there is the danger, therefore, that cases which should not be
included under Judge Bazelon's definition might be included, there is
also the risk that deserving cases of severe psychosis might be excluded.
A psychiatrist might argue that even a man suffering from definite
delusions of persecution had shown "aggression" before, and a murder
Wertham, Dark Legend (1941).
'The Psychiatry of Criminal Guilt, in Cahn, Social Meaning of Legal Concepts (1950).
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committed by him is therefore not entirely the product of his mental
disease. In the Durham case itself, the psychiatric expert testified that
he was unable to form an opinion as to what influence "the abnormal
thinking and the abnormal experiences-delusions of persecution" had
on Durham's "anti-social behavior." If a psychiatrist cannot give a
simple yes or no answer to such a simple and crucial question, a new
definition will not help him. Judge Bazelon's legal openmindedness
shows that lawyers are eager to receive concrete psychiatric information. If we have nothing to offer but psychological speculations and
highhanded pronouncements, no progress is possible. Only if we overcome this psychoauthoritarianism will psychiatry find its proper place
in the courtroom and play, as it should, a strong but subordinate role.

